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Abstract—For large-scale power networks, the failure of par-
ticular transmission lines can offload power to other lines and
cause self-protection trips to activate, instigating a cascade of
line failures. In extreme cases, this can bring down the entire
network. Learning where the vulnerabilities are and the expected
timescales for which failures are likely is an active area of
research. In this article we present a novel stochastic dynamics
model for a large-scale power network along with a framework
for efficient computer simulation of the model including long
timescale events such as cascade failure. We build on an existing
Hamiltonian formulation and introduce stochastic forcing and
damping components to simulate small perturbations to the
network. Our model and simulation framework allow assessment
of the particular weaknesses in a power network that make
it susceptible to cascade failure, along with the timescales and
mechanism for expected failures.
Index Terms—Cascading failure, stochastic differential equa-
tions, Hamiltonian systems, rare event simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern infrastructure systems depend on the de-
livery of electricity through a reliable and robust always-on
power network. However, the stability of a particular network
topology under small perturbations or malicious attack can be
difficult to accurately predict, particularly when these networks
possess self-protection. Self-protective action is ubiquitous in
electric networks and acts to disconnect components when the
state trajectory exits an acceptable operating region defined for
each component. Protective action is a positive effect when
a small number of components are saved from damage by
disconnection and the overall system “rides through” in a
stable fashion that keeps the entire network energized. In many
scenarios, however, the protective action exacerbates the effect
of an initial disturbance and induces a cascading phenomenon
that disconnects many components, de-energizing significant
portions of the network. The large number of variables and the
combinatoric breadth of cascade scenarios make anticipating
the frequency and location of potential problems a challenging
task.
The phenomenon described above is typically termed “cas-
cading failure.” Such widespread interruption of service may
indeed result from misoperation of protective relays [14], and
in these circumstances the terminology of cascading “failure”
is appropriate. However, protective relay actions also may
each be locally appropriate, operating in accordance with
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the relays desired settings, and yet a significant portion of
the network is nonetheless de-energized by their action. This
situation reflects an obvious and inherent tension in selecting
thresholds for component disconnection when designing and
setting protection. Equipment owners’ objectives are naturally
oriented toward protecting components from damage (favor-
ing “early” disconnection); in contrast, transmission system
operators (TSOs) typically seek to maintain uninterrupted
service to the greatest number of customers (favoring “late”
disconnection). This tension has emerged in recent discus-
sions between generation owners and TSOs regarding rate-of-
change-of-frequency relay protection for generators [13]. One
application of the tools to be developed here will be to better
inform this type of trade-off, providing a more global view of
the impact of protective relay settings and network topology on
resulting patterns of network outage. This global perspective
on the interaction of protection is vital; one part of the system
can be weakened or disconnected, which after load rebalancing
could result in another part of the system disconnecting if
critical transmission lines or transformers become overloaded
and trip. The effect can snowball to de-energize large parts
of the network. This type of analysis can expose hidden
fragility in a network: a system may appear robust to small
perturbations (i.e., it possesses a strong margin of stability in
small signal stability analysis that does not account for relay
action), and yet a small shock in a particular region can trigger
a cascade within the network.
Because of the high impact and visibility of the problem (the
eastern US blackout in New York in 2003 may be viewed as a
cascading failure [6]), cascading network failure has been an
extremely active area of research; a survey of the large volume
of work through 2011 is provided in [11], and much work has
followed. However, many articles focus on quasi-steady-state
representations of the network, employing Markov chain mod-
els to characterize transitions between network configurations,
with transition probabilities governed by protective relays
removing components from service. Transmission lines have
been most widely studied as the class of components removed
by relay action. Enhancements to Markov-based transition
approaches seek to capture dynamic effects, with recent work
[8] doing so by constructing a Lyapunov functional “built on
top of” the underlying Markov representation.
The work presented here is built on a nonlinear model
representing the electromechanical dynamics of the network.
Probabilistic time variation of load demand is explicitly repre-
sented to capture continuously acting stochastic disturbances
that excite these dynamics. Protective relay actions are then
represented as state-dependent discrete events, disconnecting
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
02
42
0v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  6
 Ju
n 2
01
8
2a component if the state trajectory exits a region defining the
associated relay’s operational boundary. The result is a higher-
resolution model of network dynamics than those previously
considered. This higher fidelity comes at an additional compu-
tational cost, however, and a careful treatment of the numerical
solution is required in order to make simulation practical. We
therefore introduce both an efficient time-discretization of the
model along with a technique that employs multiple parallel
simulations of the system to efficiently generate cascade failure
events that would otherwise require simulation on extremely
long timescales.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we review
the Hamiltonian formulation for the power system model
representing electromechanical dynamics, and we introduce
the stochastic perturbations to these dynamics; Section III
introduces the failure mechanism we employ in our dynamics;
Section IV discusses the effective discretization of the dynam-
ics; Section V describes an advanced sampling technique that
we have found useful in simulating the network. In Section
VI we combine the techniques to simulate a cascade failure in
small network; and in Section VII we briefly summarize our
work.
II. MODELING POWER NETWORK DYNAMICS
We dynamically model an interconnected power network as
a graph with N nodes (buses) and L power lines represented as
edges between the nodes. Nodes are split into three categories:
generator nodes, which supply power to the network; load
nodes consuming power; and slack nodes (one per connected
component of the graph), whose behavior is fixed by some
external source.
The instantaneous state of the system is given by voltage
angle, voltage magnitude, and frequency variables associated
with each node, which evolve in time according to a stochastic
differential equation (SDE) that we describe below. This
equation does not model the very fast timescale dynamics of
the switching transients (i.e., no attempt is made to accurately
model arc extinction, since an interrupted current flow tran-
sitions from hundreds of amperes to zero in a fraction of a
second). Instead, the transition associated with switching ac-
tion of relays is captured approximately by an abrupt transition
in the parameters of the SDE as described in Section III.
The state of a node n at a time t is described in our
model by its angular velocity ωn(t) as well as its voltage
magnitude Vn(t) and phase angle θn(t), in normalized “per
unit” coordinates corresponding to the physical power grid.
The values of θn and ωn are defined relative to a synchronous
reference at a time t, namely, ωn(t) = ωˆn(t) − ωˆ and
θn(t) = θˆn(t)− ωˆt, where ωˆn(t) and θˆn(t) are the physically
observed values at time t. The complex voltage phasor at node
n is similarly defined relative to a synchronous reference. The
phasor is denoted vn := Vn exp(iθn), with imaginary unit i
and |vn| = Vn.
The dynamics we impose on the system are inspired by a
Hamiltonian dynamics model, whose deterministic form has
been previously examined in [17] and [18]. We first introduce
the Hamiltonian
H(ω, θ, V ) :=
1
2
ωTMω+
1
2
vHATBγAv+P ·θ+Q·lnV (1)
where (lnV )n = lnVn and where we denote the vector of
complex voltage phasors as v with its complex conjugate
transpose written as vH . The diagonal positive-definite matrix
of normalized rotational inertia is denoted M , and vectors
of real and reactive injected power are denoted P and Q,
respectively.
We shall treat P and Q as constant vectors in our formula-
tion. In practice, their values will have small fluctuations on
short timescales, as well as larger-magnitude periodic changes
from the time of day and the season. Treating these values
as constants simplifies the dynamics and still allows us to
consider trajectories on a reasonable timescale (around six
hours).
The N×N nodal admittance matrix Ybus = ATBγA defines
the topology of the network. A is an L×N incidence matrix
defining the connections between nodes, with
Aln =
 1 If line l enters node n−1 If line l exits node n
0 otherwise.
Although we treat the power network as an undirected graph,
an implicit sign convention is introduced through the A matrix.
B is an L×L diagonal matrix with entries (Bγ)jk = δjkγjbk,
where bl > 0 gives the susceptance value of line l and γl is 1
or 0 depending on whether line l is up or down, respectively.
Here δjk is the Kronecker delta symbol, δjk = 1 if j = k, and
δjk = 0 otherwise.
This Hamiltonian is chosen so that its relevant partial deriva-
tives match the equilibrium power flow equations. Writing the
gradient operator as
∇ = [∇ω , ∇θ , ∇V ]T , (2)
we can compute the partial derivatives of H as
∇H =
 Mω−Im(diag(vH)ATBγAv) + P
Re(exp(diag(−iθ))ATBγAv) + diag(V )−1Q
 .
(3)
Denoting the equilibrium point xeq where ∇H(xeq) = 0 cor-
responds to the solution of the lossless power flow equations,
we have
0 = Pn −
N∑
k=1
VkVn(Ybus)nk sin(θn − θk),
0 = Qn +
N∑
k=1
VkVn(Ybus)nk cos(θn − θk)
for all n.
In Hamiltonian dynamics, the total energy is a first integral,
and numerical discretization schemes are constructed with the
aim of approximately preserving H [5]. To derive our stochas-
tic dynamics, we begin by assuming that the Hamiltonian
dynamics are perturbed by noise in the form of the short-
timescale fluctuations in the P and Q vectors. The behavior
3of the network will then be characterized by the statistics of
multiple random trajectories, rather than a single deterministic
trajectory.
The dynamics are chosen such that the system remains close
to xeq by perturbing standard Hamiltonian (constant-energy)
dynamics by a mild stochastic term representing random
fluctuations in the power demands at each node. This amounts
to adding two terms into the conservative dynamics: a damping
term that slowly drives the system toward xeq and a noise
term that represents the fluctuations around P and Q. The
magnitude of the damping and the noise are small enough that
if we initialize the dynamics close to xeq, then trajectories will
likely remain close by, with the fluctuation rate and magnitude
of the deviance from xeq given by parameters in the stochastic
process.
Our proposed dynamics for the network are given by the
following stochastic differential equation, which consists of
a conservative Hamiltonian part and a fluctuating Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process [12]:
dx = J∇H(x) dt− S∇H(x) dt+
√
2τS dWt, (4)
where x = (ω, θ, V )T is the state vector and Wt ∈ R3N
is a vector of 3N independent Wiener processes [12]. The
 ≥ 0 parameter gives the reciprocal timescale (or damping
parameter) for the decorrelation of stochastic fluctuations,
and τ ≥ 0 defines the strength of the noise introduced
(akin to a temperature parameter in physical interpretations
of the dynamics [4] ). Fixing  and increasing τ increase
the statistical variance in solutions at a time t, increasing the
spread away from the deterministic solution (see Figure 1).
Too small a value of τ defeats the purpose of using stochastic
methods, while too large a value of τ gives nonphysical
behavior.
S and J are symmetric and skew matrices, respectively,
defined as
J =
 0 −Il − Ig 0Il + Ig 0 0
0 0 0
 , S =
 0 0 00 Il + Ig 0
0 0 Il

with (Il)jk = δjk1l(j) and (Ig)jk = δjk1g(j), where 1l(j) =
1 if node j is a load node and 1g(j) = 1 if node j is a generator
node (and zero otherwise). This ensures that the dynamics for
the slack nodes, as well as the magnitude of voltage for the
generator nodes, are frozen in time.
The γ parameters will evolve according to the event-driven
dynamics described in Section III. For γ fixed (provided some
assumptions on the growth and boundedness of H), solutions
to (4) are known to be ergodic [9] with respect to the invariant
measure
µτ (x) = Z
−1
τ exp(−H(x)/τ), Zτ =
∫
exp(−H(x)/τ) dx
(5)
provided  and τ are both positive. Thus, if τ > 0, then
ergodicity implies [9] that
E(f(x)) :=
∫
f(x)µτ (x) dx = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(x(t))
Fig. 1. We plot the evolving distribution of θn(t) for a single node under the
dynamics (4) with  = 0.0025. We initialized the system from a point away
from xeq at time 0, with xeq marked as a black dashed line. As the damping
rate is fixed, the variance of the evolving distribution strongly depends on
the choice of τ , with the distribution remaining closer to the deterministic
trajectory for small τ .
where x(t) is a solution to (4). If  = 0, then we recover
Hamiltonian (constant-energy) dynamics. In contrast, if τ = 0
and  > 0, then we obtain the steepest decent method when
using an Euler discretization [10], with a trajectory converging
toward xeq.
The ergodicity property when τ > 0 provides a useful
way of tuning the τ parameter to realistic data. As solutions
to the SDE are distributed according to µτ (x), the long-
time distribution of one variable can be found by computing
the relevant integral to find its expectation. For example, the
distribution of ω can be found by integrating out the remaining
variables in the distribution:
ω ∼
∫ ∫
µτ (ω, θ, V ) dθ dV ∝ exp
(
−1
2
ωTMω/τ
)
since the Hamiltonian H(x) in µτ is separable. Thus we expect
ω ∼ Normal(0, τM−1).
Physical observations corroborate that the angular momen-
tum is normally distributed [7], and we can choose the
parameter τ to match the physically observed variance of the
angular velocity as if M = diag(m) then var(ωn) = τ/mn.
In normal operations, the range for frequency is 59.95 Hz
to 60.05 for 99.95 % of the time [7], and thus the standard
deviation std(ω) ≈ 0.016 Hz. This gives a realistic choice for
τ/mn as around 2.5× 10−4.
While changing τ can have a significant impact on the
timescales and qualitative features of the simulation (see
Figure 1), we find that the results are far more tolerant to
different choices of the damping parameter . One simply
needs to choose a timescale long enough (and hence  small
enough) to ensure that the timescale of the fluctuations are
longer than important features of the simulation. In what
follows, we have chosen  = 0.05s−1.
The continuous dynamics themselves are useless without an
efficient way to generate solution trajectories on a computer.
This is achieved through a novel discretization scheme that
reduces observed error in averages, discussed in detail in
Section IV. Before addressing this practical concern, however,
we introduce in the following section the mechanism by which
we characterize the propagation of line failures in the system.
4III. LINE FAILURE AND QUANTIFYING NETWORK
ROBUSTNESS
Our motivation for introducing the stochastic dynamics, as
outlined in Section I, is to gather statistics and classify failures
of the network. The most common way to approximate the
behavior of the physical network at a failure point is to mimic
the responses of the thermal relay on each power line, by
removing a line from service when the energy on the line
becomes too large (i.e. setting γl → 0). One can emulate this
behavior in simulation in many ways. Perhaps the simplest is
checking the line flows at an equilibrium predicted by the dc
power flow approximation xeq as in [16]. In [3], [17], and
[18], deterministic equations based on the Hamiltonian (1) (or
similar formulations) are coupled with a continuous dynamics
for the γ parameters approximating the relay decision logic.
Here we choose a simple event-driven dynamics for γ:
we remove line l by switching γl = 0 instantaneously
when some condition is met. In our model, lines are either
removed intentionally as part of some scenario (replicating
some environmental effects) or in order to model thermal and
stability constraints imposed by the maximum load allowed
on a line. In the latter case we monitor the line energy of line
l, defined as
Θl :=
1
2
bl |vlin − vlout |2 ,
where lin and lout are the indexes of the nodes that line l joins
in the network.
We model the failure dynamics as an irreversible change
that alters network topology and hence moves the equilibrium
point xeq. An interesting feature of this formalism is that
we can capture the timescale and trajectory of the system as
it transitions between neighborhoods of xeq(old) to xeq(new),
which correspond to the stable regions before and after the
line failure.
Our general algorithm for the simulation of the network is
as follows.
1) Initialize the system by setting x ← xeq for the initial
choice of γ.
2) Evolve the system for time h using the numerical
discretization scheme, and set t← t+ h.
3) Any line l with line energy Θl above a given threshold
has γl ← 0.
4) Any line l no longer connected to a slack node has
γl ← 0.
5) If t < T , then go to 2; otherwise finish.
We would expect that, just as in the real system, no lines
should fail when we run a simulation initialized with all lines
up (γ = 1) and with the system in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium point xeq. For a weakened system, however, with
one or two lines already down, the stress on some lines may be
large enough to cause them to fail either immediately or within
some time horizon. Note that this failure may occur when
the system transitions between the neighborhoods around the
successive equilibria corresponding to a change in γ; and while
the equilibrium points themselves may not have lines with
excessive line energies, the probable transition path between
them may. An example is shown in Figure 2, where an initial
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Fig. 2. We simulate the network plotted in Figure 3 using the algorithm given
in Section IV. The model is weakened initially by removing a critical line,
and we use a low threshold for the thermal relays, ensuring rapid failures.
Plotted is the line energy, normalized by the tripping threshold, for all 453
lines. Random fluctuations cause the first line to disconnect after 164 seconds,
rapidly leading to total failure of the network.
failure causes a cascade of follow-on events as the system
transitions between configurations.
With our framework presented in Section II we can compute
the likelihood of a failure occurring in a particular scenario,
and we can give the expected time and transition pathway for
the failures themselves. We do so by generating a large number
of realizations of the solutions to (4) and computing average
statistics.
We use the total supplied load as a measure for the perfor-
mance of the network. The load served by the network is a
function of which lines are up or down, with
L(γ) :=
PT IlΛ(γ)
PT Il1
,
where Λ(γ) ∈ RN is the vector indicating which nodes are
connected to a reference node, with
Λn(γ) =
{
1 Node n is connected to a slack node
0 otherwise.
For a trajectory γ(t), L is piecewise constant in time, with
changes occurring only when γ(t) is modified such that a load
bus is removed from a subnetwork containing the slack node.
Of key interest for a trajectory is the normalized cumulative
load served over an interval [0, T ]
L(T ) := 1
T
∫ T
0
L(γ(t)) dt ∈ [0, 1], L(0) = L(γ(0)).
This quantity gives a reference of the load that has been shed
by the network due to lines being removed. Thus, L(t) = 1
indicates that the network has supplied the total demanded
load for time t. Since we assume that lines cannot be restored
during a simulation, L will be strictly decreasing after the first
line failure. This is a more valuable statistic than the number
of lines remaining or buses connected, since lines can fail or
islands can form without consequence to the overall utility of
the network.
A simple strategy is to test scenarios of interest and look at
the distribution of L(T ) for some time horizon T . Simulations
with a low cumulative load served reveal a weakness in the
network that can be studied by using trajectory data.
Of particular interest is establishing a typical order of events
to quantify a network’s progress toward failure. The most
5Fig. 3. The benchmark power network [2] used in our tests. There are 145
buses (95 load buses as green circles, 49 generators as red squares, and 1
slack bus as a blue square) connected by 453 power lines.
natural way to characterize this progress is to look at the order
that lines trip in simulations. A large network, however, may
have a very large number of relatively likely sequences of
line failures, due to the combinatorial explosion in sequences
of lines of a certain length.
We have found that a simple and effective way to charac-
terize the path toward failure is to use a clustering algorithm
that groups lines together and to classify the failure path by
the order that lines in those groups are removed from service.
We use Matlab’s linkage command to build hierarchical
clusters of downed lines using the distance metric between
lines j and k, djk, defined as
djk := E(|ρ(γj(t))− ρ(γk(t))| | ρ(γj(t))ρ(γk(t)) <∞),
where
ρ(γl(t)) = min({t : t > 0, γl(t) = 0})
gives the failure time of line l for a trajectory γ(t). Thus we
may think of djk as being the mean difference in failure times
between lines j and k, conditional on their failing. Lines that
often fail together have a shorter distance in this metric and
are consequently grouped together by the clustering scheme.
The hierarchical scheme we use groups lines into clusters and
subclusters to better understand how lines fail together.
IV. SIMULATION OF THE NETWORK
Since the goal of our modeling is to probe the statistics of
the system as it evolves, we seek to generate a large number
of trajectories by solving the dynamics (4). Because of the
dimensionality of the state x and the complexity of the Hamil-
tonian defining the dynamics, finding analytical solutions is
not feasible. We turn instead to a numerical timestepping
algorithm with time discretization parameter (timestep) h > 0
to advance from x(t) to x(t+ h). The parameter h is usually
chosen after some experimentation—too small a choice in-
creases the computational effort required to simulate to time T
(the required wall time is usually O(T/h)), while increasing h
can create instability in the system or a large error in observed
averages.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN SCHEMES
Scheme Wall Time Line Energy Error Hitting Time Error
Euler 8.46s 34.1± 0.8% 66.4± 0.5%
Heun 13.94s 5.2± 0.7% 23.8± 1.8%
Structure Pres. 16.41s 1.7± 0.5% 4.1± 2.0%
L-M 8.70s 0.8± 0.5% 2.8± 1.4%
We seek to minimize two quantities when considering algo-
rithms for propagating the dynamics: computational cost and
discretization error. The algorithms we consider involve simple
matrix-vector operations, with the major cost coming from the
evaluation of ∇H . Although solutions to the dynamics (4) will
sample the distribution µτ , the discretization algorithms give
an approximation to the solution with a statistical error that
vanishes as h → 0 (as long as the algorithm is consistent).
This discretization error we are interested in is the observed
bias in average quantities taken over the discretized trajectory.
We compare results for four discretization algorithms imple-
mented in a python code, on a small benchmark system of 145
buses and 453 lines taken from [2], plotted in Figure 3. The
computational cost (measured in wall time) and introduced
discretization bias (using the computed error in averages) are
compared at a fixed stepsize h = 2−5s and time window
T = 100s, initializing the variables at xeq with all lines up
(γ = 1). More details about the schemes can be found in the
Appendix.
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table I.
We give the mean wall-clock time for one run of each of the
schemes. We also give the relative error in the average variance
of the line energy for one line and the average time for the
line’s energy to reach 4.5% of its susceptance value. These
quantities should be general enough to be representative of
the quality of other averages.
In our test the LM scheme is significantly more accurate
than the Heun method and costs roughly half the time of the
structure-preserving scheme. Hence in what follows we use the
LM scheme to compute statistical quantities and to propagate
solutions from time t to time t+ h.
V. PARALLEL REPLICA DYNAMICS
We can trivially parallelize our simulation method to gather
statistics efficiently by running multiple independent simula-
tions in parallel. We cannot easily parallelize the dynamics in
time, however, so increasing available computing resources
will generally not allow running the system over a longer
time horizon for a given wall-clock limit. We may utilize
parallelism in our computation of the ∇H term to speed each
iteration; however, this is not without difficulty and seldom
leads to a linear speedup.
The Parallel Replica Dynamics (ParRep) technique, orig-
inally proposed for rare-event simulation in computational
chemistry [1], [15], allows one to achieve an (approximately)
linear speedup in the number of processors while still recover-
ing exact statistics. Multiple copies (replicas) of the simulation
are run simultaneously until one of them has a line failure.
6The other simulations are discarded, and all simulations are
restarted from the replica which had the failure (after some
decorrelation time). The correct, exponentially distributed,
failure times are then calculated by scaling the first exit times
by the number of replicas used.
Full details of the algorithm can be found in the given
references or in the Appendix.
VI. NUMERICAL TESTS
We perform two tests on the network plotted in Figure 3,
with 145 buses (including 49 generators and 1 slack bus) and
453 lines.
A. Low-threshold network
We set our threshold parameter for all lines to be reasonably
low, so that a line is disconnected if its energy reaches 6.5%
of its susceptance value. For each line l, we run ten pilot
simulations for T = 600s, with the system initialized at
xeq but with γl(1) = 0; that is, line l is disconnected after
an initial burn-in time of 1s. The average cumulative load
served L(T ) was computed for each experiment and compared
across all runs. One line in particular (l = 164) showed a
significant deficiency in cumulative served load following its
disconnection, even though by disconnecting this one line we
do not directly isolate any nodes. In what follows, we perform
multiple experiments with this line initially removed.
We run 1,024 simulations for a total time of T = 2
hours or until the network reaches total failure, using a
timestep of h = 0.02 s with the LM algorithm. This timestep
was chosen for a balance between efficiency and accuracy;
although the trajectories appeared stable even up to h = 0.04
s, the statistical properties of the simulation were qualitatively
changed when using such a large discretization (we observed
that the rate of failure was significantly increased).
For this parameterization, over 99% of simulations resulted
in failure in the chosen time horizon, where the condition for
network failure is the isolation of all load nodes from the
slack node. In our simulations, network failure occurred as a
result of all lines having been disconnected from the slack.
In less than 1% of the simulations where the network did not
completely fail, the network remained stable up to t = T , with
around 60% of the total load being served (consistently in the
stable case L(T ) = 0.58).
Relabeling the lines by their ranked mean disconnection
time, we plot dij in Figure 4, computed from all trajectories
that ended in network failure. The apparent structure shows
large numbers of lines failing simultaneously (because of their
disconnection from the network), partitioned into groupings.
Between these groups, we can see that a waiting period before
the subsequent group of lines fails. Non-overlapping squares
indicate that one must wait for over 1 s between successive
disconnection events (as any dij > 1 is colored yellow). We
plot the data on a log scale to illustrate that the scale of these
waves of disconnections grows exponentially as parts of the
network become isolated from the slack node.
Running the hierarchical clustering algorithm described in
Section IV on this data gives five clusters that match the five
Line index i
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Fig. 4. We plot dij as a function of the line indexes i and j, where we have
sorted the lines by their expected failure time. Blue indicates a small value of
dij , while yellow indicates dij ≥ 1. The axes are on a log scale to show that
successive failures result in (roughly) an exponentially increasing number of
line disconnections.
 0 1 2 3 4
Manual 
disconnection of 
line 164
L=1.0 L=1.0
t=60s t=1.2s t=0.9s t=1.7s t=0.9s
t=8.9s
>99%
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Fig. 5. The transition state flowchart for the model described in Section
VI-A. Each node represents a state visible in Figure 4, with the expected
time between transitions marked on each arrow and the expected load marked
above each node. Diagrams for the network for states 0–4 are also pictured,
with the failed lines marked in blue.
blue boxes in the diagram, where the fourth cluster is only
six lines and the fifth cluster corresponds to all remaining
lines. Grouping the lines into these clusters, we can extract
expected transition times from the data to build up a picture
of our progress toward total disconnection in a simulation.
If we consider the system entering a new state when a line
disconnects from the next group, we can estimate the transition
times between the states from the accumulated trajectory data.
Beginning with the stable γ = 1 configuration, the subsequent
state is entered after the initial disconnection of line 164 at
t = 1. The states displayed in Figure 5 match the regions
in Figure 4. In Figure 5 we also plot the expected times for
transitions between the states.
We conclude that our model indicates that the lines will fail
in several clusters that can each be considered to fail almost
7simultaneously. This is apparent from the colors of the corner-
pixels of each cluster’s box in Figure 4, which gives dij for
the first and last line to fail in a particular cluster. This shows
that we get a large chunk of disconnected lines within a small
time, rather than a gradual disconnection.
When in state 3 (as labeled in Figure 5) , almost all simula-
tions go on to become unstable (ending in total disconnection),
moving to state 4 in a mean time of 1.7 s. However, some
simulations (less than 1%) took far longer to leave state 3
and resulted in a configuration that remained stable over a
long time. We can interpret this as the system exiting the well
associated with this state at different points in space, where
one exit (leading to state 4) is lower energy (and hence more
probable) than the other.
This example provides insight into an effective strategy
setting relay thresholds in order to minimize the portion of
the network “lost” through the action of protection. One
could lower the barrier for the exit point leading to this
stable configuration, in order to increase the probability that
we transition into the stable basin. Doing so amounts to
making the relevant line (line 17) disconnect automatically
upon reaching state 3—purposefully sacrificing part of the
network in order to save the 58% load that is supplied. Finding
which line we need to disconnect in order to enact this strategy
amounts to examining the failure pathway of the trajectories
that correspond to this stable transition. In this case, we find
that line 17 failing first is correlated with the stable transition
in state 3.
B. Failure times at higher thresholds
We now look at how changing the global threshold for
relay tripping affects the expected time for total failure of
the network. We vary the threshold between the 6.5% value
used in Section VI-A and 7.9% of a line’s susceptance value.
For each threshold value we run sixteen independent experi-
ments to gather statistics. For experiments using the highest
thresholds, line failures become significantly rarer after the
initial disconnection; therefore, accumulating good statistics
on failure times requires a longer wall-clock time without
enhanced sampling techniques.
We compare results from using the brute force strategy,
where we simply sample independent trajectories in parallel,
with results from using the ParRep method.For the latter
scheme, we run on ten Intel E5-2670 nodes, using 160 parallel
execution threads over MPI. We use Tdephase = Tdecorr = 100
s, for all the experiments, which gives the system enough time
to decorrelate from an initial condition.
We compare the results from experiments at fifteen different
threshold values within our specified range. The qualitative
path to failure for the network (see Figure 5) was not signifi-
cantly different across the ranges of thresholds tested, but the
time of the first failure after initial disconnection significantly
increased as the threshold was raised. The reason is that
subsequent failures cause a surge in line energy large enough
that we see successive, rapid follow-on failures, whereas the
initial failure comes not from a surge but from the system
wandering far enough away from xeq in a random walk.
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Fig. 6. The mean first failure of the power network as we change the
global failure threshold, computed from the direct sampling (blue) and parallel
replica (red) schemes. The two methods show good overlap, demonstrating
an exponential relationship between failure time and failure threshold.
In Figure 6 we plot the mean time for first failure as
we change the global threshold, with error bars computed
over the sixteen runs. We run experiments using the direct
sampling scheme up to the 7.3% threshold and experiments
using ParRep from 7.0% onwards. The overlap in results from
the repeated experiments demonstrates that the two methods
have good agreement, falling within each other’s error bars.
The reason for not completing the entirety of the experiments
with direct sampling is the increase in wall-clock time: the
total wall-clock time should scale linearly with the failure
time of the system, and hence the wall-clock time at 7.9%
will be approximately 200× larger than that at 7.3%. However,
ParRep gives an approximately linear speedup as we use more
parallel threads, allowing us to reach these longer timescales.
Our results suggest an exponential relationship between the
failure time and threshold, although at lower thresholds the
network takes longer than expected to fail. The reason may
be that our initialization period is too short, so the system
begins too close to xeq rather than being decorrelated. As the
threshold is increased, this effect decreases because the initial
decorrelation time becomes small relative to the exponentially
increasing failure time. Even a small increase in the line-
tripping thresholds has a large impact on the stability of the
network. From the results in Figure 6, we can see that around
a 0.3% increase in the absolute line threshold yields a factor
of 10 increase in expected time to failure.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article we have introduced and developed a novel
framework for studying the evolution of dynamics in electrical
power grids. By adding a stochastic term to the constant-
energy dynamics the system explores state space indepen-
dently of the initial condition provided and at a rate inferred
from physical observations. We have demonstrated how statis-
tics, including failure rates and paths toward cascade failure,
can be gathered by solving the associated SDEs.
8The approximate solution to these SDEs can be found by
iterating a simple algorithm that, when tested, is found to be
relatively cheap (compared with alternatives) and minimizes
the error in statistics computed along the solution trajectory.
Additionally we give an enhanced sampling algorithm that
allows for significant improvements over direct sampling when
a large amount of computing resources are available.
Numerical experiments show an exponential relationship
between the line failure threshold and the failure of lines.
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9APPENDIX A
NUMERICAL DISCRETIZATION ALGORITHMS
The numerical algorithms we use in Section IV for discretiz-
ing (4) are given below, where our approximation for x(t) is
denoted xt. Rt is a vector of 3N i.i.d. unit normal random
numbers, with E(Rt ·Rs) = 3Nδts.
A. Euler scheme
See any relevant statistics textbook, e.g. [10], for a detailed
discussion on the Euler and Heun discretizations.
xt+h = xt − h(J − S)∇H(xt) +
√
2hτSRt
B. Heun’s method
yt = xt − h(J − S)∇H(xt) +
√
2hτSRt,
xt+h = xt − h
2
(J − S)(∇H(xt) +∇H(yt)) +
√
2hτSRt
C. Structure preserving scheme
We split J = J1 + J2 where
J1 =
 0 0 0Il + Ig 0 0
0 0 0
 , J2 =
 0 −Il − Ig 00 0 0
0 0 0

Then the algorithm is written in-situ as
xˆ← xt
xˆ← xˆ+ h
2
J1∇H(xˆ)
xˆ← xˆ+ h
2
J2∇H(xˆ)
y ← xˆ− hS∇H(xˆ) +
√
2hSτRt,
xˆ← xˆ− h
2
S (∇H(xˆ) +∇H(y)) +
√
2hSτRt,
xˆ← xˆ+ h
2
J1∇H(xˆ)
xˆ← xˆ+ h
2
J2∇H(xˆ)
xt+h ← xˆ
D. LM scheme
The details of this algorithm can be found in [4].
xt+h = xt − h(J − S)∇H(xt) +
√
hτS
2
(Rt +Rt+h)
